論壇主題：Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm及其可能的擴(kuò)展方向研討會
講座時(shí)間：2019年4月30日（周二）下午14:30-16:30
主持人：蔡曉慧博士
講座地點(diǎn)：金融學(xué)院422會議室
文章基本信息：Abstract: This paper provides a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should be carried out within a firm and when through the market. Following Grossman and Hart, we identify a firm with the assets that its owners control. We argue that the crucial difference for party 1 between owning a firm (integration) and contracting for a service from another party 2 who owns this firm (nonintegration) is that, under integration, party 1 can selectively fire the workers of the firm (including party 2), whereas under nonintegration he can "fire" (i.e., stop dealing with) only the entire firm: the combination of party 2, the workers, and the firm's assets. We use this idea to study how changes in ownership affect the incentives of employees as well as those of owner-managers. Our frame- work is broad enough to encompass more general control structures than simple ownership: for example, partnerships and worker and consumer cooperatives all emerge as special cases.
Author(s): Oliver Hart and John Moore
Source: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6 (Dec., 1990), pp. 1119-1158
研討會內(nèi)容：論文的相關(guān)內(nèi)容及其可能的擴(kuò)展方向
